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Abstract: Social security systems for old age have been explicitly studied in a public 
choice framework for over 30 years. They illustrate extremely well the problems of 
allocating economic resources through a system of voting. Pension systems also 
currently provide some of the most significant threats to the long-term budget positions of 
developed countries, a point that was made in the Nobel Laureate lecture of Professor 
James Buchanan. In this paper, we look at the costs and benefits that will be faced by 
different groups of voters as a result of state pension reform in the UK. It is shown that 
state pension systems will be very difficult to reform in ways that reduce government 
provision. However, an exception to this general rule is that reform by raising retirement 
ages may well be politically feasible. These results are in accordance, not just with 
theoretical work, but with other empirical work and practical observations. 
Keywords: Public choice economics; pensions policy; state pension 
reform; social security 
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Introduction 
The original work by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock1 in the field of 
public choice economics and rent seeking has spurned a literature on 
public choice and state pensions. This is not surprising given the 
importance of state pensions in redistributing income and providing 
income in old age in most democracies. However, it is also the case that 
state pensions are particularly amenable to investigation using certain 
forms of public choice model, for reasons discussed below. The issue is 
important given that the implicit social security debts represent some of 
the biggest financial obligations of developed-country governments.  
 
Public choice economists, of course, do not argue that self interest is the 
only motivating factor when people take decisions at the ballot box. Rather 
they argue that it is prudent to assume that self interest could be one 
amongst many motivating factors. As Buchanan points out, public choice 
                                            
1 For example, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Tullock (1967).  
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theory suggests that self interest is a “positively valued good” in 
influencing decisions and it does not say to what extent it dominates: “This 
assumption [of self interest] does not place economic interest in a 
dominating position and it surely does not imply imputing evil or malicious 
motives to political actors…” (Buchanan, 1986). 
 
Even if only a proportion of voters vote according to their perceived self 
interest, as the electorate ages there will be increased pressure to expand 
payments under public pension schemes. One way of assessing the 
influence of changes in age structure on pensions policy is through 
median voter models. Though the criticisms and qualifications made by 
other authors, such as Verbon (1983), should not be dismissed, median-
voter public choice models of voter behaviour do have predictive power 
and we will use such models here. 
 
Precisely how changes in the composition of the electorate will affect 
public policy will vary from country to country and depend on voting 
systems and the structure of state pension systems. However, as Galasso 
(2006) shows, some lessons are remarkably general.  
 
In the context of a public choice analysis of state pension schemes, it is, in 
fact, worth noting a particularly prescient statement made by Edward 
Marshall, former president of the Actuarial Society of America, at the First 
Business Meeting of the Centenary Assembly of the Institute of Actuaries 
on 22nd June 1948: 
 
There was at the existing time great political pressure from 
Governments to adopt or maintain ambitious programmes of so-
called social security, with perhaps too little understanding of their 
ultimate effect on the social and economic structure. A sound social 
insurance and superannuation programme could sustain and 
strengthen a nation; on the other hand, a sufficiently unsound one 
could ultimately destroy it. Furthermore, once such a programme 
was put into effect it became politically impossible to discard it or to 
reduce the benefit scales which it was beyond the ability of the 
nation’s economy to support. (Marshall, 1950, my italics) 
 
It is precisely this last observation that is analysed here. It is also notable 
that economist, Alfred Marshall, told the 1893 Royal Commission on the 
aged poor, ‘they [universal state pension systems] do not contain in 
themselves the seeds of their own disappearance. I am afraid that, if 
started, they would tend to become perpetual’. If one accepts the analysis 
below, this statement is prophetic. 
 
Public choice models and pay-as-you-go-pension 
systems 
 
A theoretical model of social security in a democracy was developed by 
Browning (1975). He demonstrated that, in a pure democracy, there are 
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strong incentives to increase the size of social security pension systems 
beyond their optimal level. When pay-as-you-go2 (PAYGO) pension 
systems are expanded, the only cohort that pays the full cost of the 
expansion is that just beginning its working life. That group will pay a 
working lifetime of higher contributions (social security taxes) to obtain a 
higher pension from retirement age. Older workers, however, will receive 
some form of subsidy from later entrants to the workforce. This is because 
older workers will pay the higher contributions needed to finance higher 
benefits for only a portion of their working life yet they will receive a higher 
pension throughout their retirement. This problem is inherent in the nature 
of PAYGO systems3. At the extreme, of course, people who have already 
retired will be able to vote for higher pensions without bearing any of the 
costs themselves. Buchanan (1986) specifically mentioned this problem of 
implicit debt in social security systems in his Nobel Laureate lecture. 
 
There are recognised inconsistencies in the Browning model (see, for 
example, Verbon, 1987 and the references therein such as Tullock, 1983). 
For example, the model implicitly assumes that the electorate votes for a 
policy change which it believes to be permanent whereas, in fact, future 
electorates will be able to change the policy. However, Browning’s 
conclusions about the ability of an electorate to expand existing social 
security systems beyond their optimal size is a good starting point for 
discussion and analysis. It is especially robust if the median age of voters 
is expected to continue to rise: there will then be little pressure to reverse 
a policy change that has involved raising the level of benefits.   
 
There is, of course, no single accepted model of behaviour in public 
choice theory. Various models are discussed in the theoretical literature 
(see Mueller, 2003). Median voter models are more straightforward when 
choices are clear and linear. As it happens, policies related to state 
pension provision fit into this model of public choice fairly well because the 
net benefits of an increase in state pensions are, more or less, a linear 
function of age4. Also, those who benefit from an increase in the state 
pension usually have relatively “coherent” preferences – i.e. they are 
interested in a relatively small number of issues at an election (such as 
pensions, social care provision and healthcare). This might suggest that 
median voter models are, if anything, conservative in their predictions. 
Predictions of public choice models 
 
Using public choice models of voter behaviour, we can make a range of a 
priori predictions about voter behaviour in relation to PAYGO pension 
systems, specifically:  
 
                                            
2 “Pay as you go” state pension schemes are those pension schemes where current 
pensions are paid using tax receipts from the current generation of taxpayers.  
3 As will be discussed below, it is possible to have some sort of quasi-contractual 
arrangement whereby the accruals principle is applied so that if voters support an 
increase in pensions, this will only apply to entitlement earned in future years.  
4 This is slightly complicated by the fact that state pension schemes often contain an 
element of redistribution. This will be discussed below. 
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• The greater the proportion of older voters, the higher the level of 
social security pensions. 
• The greater the level of political freedom, the less likely it is that a 
country will have social security reform that involves reducing the 
size of PAYGO pension systems. 
• The more efficiently taxes can be levied, the higher will be the level 
of social security pensions. This is a subtle but important point. If a 
tax system is inefficient then an economy reaches its maximum 
taxable capacity at lower tax rates. In this case, middle-age people 
will be less willing to vote for an increase in pensions because the 
increase in taxes necessary to generate a given increase in 
revenue to finance the increase in pensions will be higher. 
• Systems based on earnings-related pensions are likely to grow 
bigger than those which are not because earnings-related pensions 
distort labour markets less than systems that provide flat-rate 
benefits. In an earnings-related system, a higher level of earnings 
gives rise to an entitlement to higher pensions. This, in turn, 
partially offsets the disincentive effect of higher levels of social 
security contributions required on higher earnings. As a result, 
taxes levied to finance earnings-related pensions distort the labour 
market less than taxes levied to finance flat-rate pensions.  
• It will be harder for voters to expand systems based on an accruals5 
principle, but, at the same time, it will be harder to reduce accrued 
pensions that have already been promised in such a system. The 
reason for this is that those who have already accrued pension 
have a very strong interest in fighting any reduction in their 
entitlement and such groups will be willing to invest a lot of time and 
money in campaigning to protect their benefit. 
• Reform based on increasing the age at which state pensions 
become payable may be achievable when other reforms are not.  
 
There is empirical evidence to confirm these hypotheses. For example, 
Breyer and Craig (1997) test public choice models for 20 OECD countries 
over four decades. They found a very strong relationship between median 
voter age and pension programme size. An increase in median voter age 
of one year added 0.5% to the share of national income taken by the 
pensions programme. Cremer and Pestiau (2000) confirm that a 
contributory, accruals-based system can set up “entrenched interests” that 
are harder to overcome than other interests in a public choice model as 
individuals who have accrued entitlements hold a political weight stronger 
than their numbers suggest. Wang and Davis (2003) show that the 
proportion of older people in a country and the level of political freedom 
help explain resistance to the contraction of PAYGO pension systems – 
though the analysis is complicated by the strong correlation between 
political freedom and the proportion of the population aged 65 or over 
(their variable to represent ageing). 
 
                                            
5 In a system based on accruals, individuals “earn” entitlement to pension for each year 
they are in the labour force. It is a quasi-contractual system. This contrasts with a system 
where the level of pension is simply determined, for all pensioners, by the government of 
the day.  
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The experience of successful reform programmes also helps to confirm 
some of the above predictions. Pension reform has recently been 
undertaken in Sweden. This is perhaps surprising given the demographic 
background there. In the 20th century6 the age of the median voter has 
increased by eight years to 47.5 and young people between the ages of 
20 and 25 fell by half as a proportion of the electorate. Despite this 
background, a new pension system was introduced during the 1990s that 
reduced both costs and pension benefits. Unsurprisingly, the package was 
attractive to younger voters. Voters over 57 years of age were not affected 
and had no incentive to oppose the proposals. The voting behaviour of 
middle-aged groups would depend on their specific income characteristics 
but, overall, the reforms were designed in such a way that, according to 
Kruse (2005), votes in favour of the reform would have been expected to 
outnumber votes against the reform if voters voted according to their 
financial best interests. In a public choice analysis of reforms, Kruse 
(2005, page 14) says, that it was such a “smart use of the transition rules” 
that made reform possible.  
 
Other pension system reforms have only been achieved by removing the 
costs of reform from the older generation of the population entirely – 
effectively “buying off” interest groups. For example, where Chilean-type7 
reforms based on compulsory personal accounts have been implemented, 
older people and middle-aged people have often been excluded from the 
new arrangements altogether (see Stroinski, 1998 for an analysis of Polish 
reforms). This has made reform acceptable to electorate. Alternatively, the 
value of the accrued rights of people affected by reform has been 
crystallised in the form of “recognition bonds” – non-tradable or tradable 
bonds that reflect accrued rights within an existing system.  
 
In many other countries, the only type of pension reform that has been 
possible has involved raising the retirement age8. Galasso (2006) has a 
major study of this type of reform and it is covered in detail below. 
UK population modelling 
 
Galasso (2006) has used very sophisticated general-equilibrium economic 
models to analyse pensions in a public choice framework in a number of 
EU countries. The investigations below use less sophisticated partial 
equilibrium models but with more explicit assumptions which make the 
results clearer, and the application of the model more flexible. It should be 
mentioned that, where possible, the results have been cross checked 
against the results of Galasso (2006) and there is a high degree of 
correspondence. Galasso’s general equilibrium models pick up second 
order effects which, for our purposes, are not important.  
 
                                            
6 The state pension system was established at the beginning of the 20th century. 
7 Of course, Chile itself was not a democracy at the time of reform but, even there, some 
groups were exempted from pension reforms as a result of parliamentary pressure from 
representatives with close ties to those groups.  
8 This has happened twice in the UK, with little opposition. 
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The model was used to examine public choice pressures in the UK Basic 
State Pension (BSP) system. This system offers little protection for 
accrued rights and therefore the scope and size of the system can be 
expanded and contracted by the elected government: in particular, the 
level of pension can be changed and the method of indexation can be 
changed by ministers acting through Parliament. This arrangement means 
that the system falls between the tax transfer systems and insurance-
based systems that are discussed by Verbon (1987) and Buchanan 
(1983). The implicit liability that Buchanan describes as being very difficult 
to default upon is less clear in the UK BSP and thus it would seem 
amenable to median-voter analysis. The other UK state pension benefit, 
known as the State Second Pension, provides stronger guarantees that 
past accrual will not be altered in either direction and we will therefore 
ignore this aspect of the state pension system. 
The population model 
A population model of the UK economy was developed that shows the 
actual and anticipated numbers in different age groups from 2004 to 2078. 
The model was based on the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) 
UK population projections, using 2004 as a base year9. In turn, those 
projections are based on the UK government’s Registrar General’s 
estimate of the resident population of the UK. The population includes all 
residents, irrespective of nationality. For each age, the starting population 
plus net migrants less deaths gives the number in the population, one year 
older, at the end of the year. To this number births are added. Age is 
defined as completed years at the last birthday. The number of births in 
the year is estimated by taking the average number of women at each 
single year of age during the year and multiplying by the fertility rate 
applicable to them during that year. The total number of births in a year is 
divided between the sexes in the ratio of 105 males to 100 females, in line 
with recent experience. Mortality is assumed to improve at 1.0% per 
annum at each age in line with GAD projections. Migration is assumed to 
continue at its current rate, which is derived by GAD using International 
Passenger Survey (IPS) as a principal source though the population was 
projected with and without migrants. 
 
Developments in the age structure of the UK voting population 
 
The population model was used to project the proportion of the voting 
population aged over 55 and the median age of voters in the UK electorate 
using four different assumptions: 
 
1. The likelihood of a member of the electorate voting was the same 
for people of all ages and there was no migration. 
2. The likelihood of a member of the electorate voting was the same 
for people of all ages but the population was subject to migration. 
                                            
9 Full details can be found on www.gad.gov.uk  
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3. People of different ages had differing propensities to vote, based on 
the propensities to vote at the 2005 general election in the UK but 
the population was not subject to migration. 
4. People of different ages had different propensities to vote but the 
population was subject to migration. 
 
It is a subjective matter how one should treat the two variables here – 
migration and the propensity to vote. In general, migrants will lower the 
median age of the population (at least at first) and continued migration is 
likely to limit the expected increase in the median age of the electorate in 
the coming generation. However, though it is too early to observe how the 
current generation of migrants will behave, migrants tend not to vote until 
settled in a country for a long time10; they also often return to their country 
of origin after a few years.  
 
Regarding the propensity to vote, in most countries there is a tendency for 
the propensity to vote to rise with age. There are various possible reasons 
for this. It is possible that older people have a lower marginal cost of time 
in which case one would expect current patterns to prevail into the future. 
It is also possible that today’s older generation value their vote to a greater 
extent than the young because of their knowledge of the threat of fascist 
and communist dictatorships in other countries during the last century, or 
because they are more aware of recent generations not having a universal 
franchise. If this were the case, voting propensities across the age groups 
would tend to equalise over time (at a lower level).  
 
In most of the financial calculations below, we have assumed that there is 
no migration and ignored age-related propensities to vote. Overall, as will 
be seen, the impact of ignoring voting propensities leads to conclusions 
being more optimistic than they otherwise would be. The impact of 
ignoring migration gives rise to slightly less optimistic results – though this 
effect does not completely offset the effect of ignoring voting propensities. 
On balance, our results are probably slightly optimistic and understate 
voter pressure to expand state pension systems.  
 
The demographic composition of the population was examined under the 
four different assumptions noted above. The projected proportion of voters 
who will be age 55 or older between 2004 and 2055 is shown in Figure 
One.  
 
It can be seen that, even under the most optimistic assumptions11, the 
proportion of people over the age of 55 (that is within sight of current state 
pension age) will rise from about 35% of the population to about 47% of 
the population over the next 50 years. If we allow for older people being 
more likely to vote, the proportion of the active voting population over age 
55 is already nearly 45% and, on the assumption also that migrants do not 
vote, will rise to nearly 60% over the next 50 years. Given that, in the UK, 
a party needs only about 40% of the voting electorate (about 28% of the 
total electorate) to form a working government and given also what has 
                                            
10 Indeed, they are often not permitted to vote. 
11 That is that all people are equally likely to vote and assuming migrantion. 
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been noted about the coherence of the interests of older voters, these 
figures are stark. Work published in Booth (2008a) shows comparable 
figures for other European countries and New Zealand. In all cases other 
than New Zealand the ageing of the electorate is even more pronounced 
than in the UK. 
 
The age of the median voter 
 
The population model was used, together with actuarial mathematics 
techniques, to estimate the age of the median voter. This was then used in 
the further computations below. The progression of the age of the median 
voter is shown in figure two, below. It is notable that, using an independent 
population model, Galasso (2006) came to similar conclusions for the UK 
as those presented here. 
 
Under the most unfavourable set of assumptions (no migration but 
incorporating age-related propensities to vote) the median age of the 
voting electorate will rise to about 60 over the coming 50 years. If we 
make allowances for migration then the median age will rise to 57. In most 
of our calculations we have assumed no migration but a uniform 
propensity to vote. This produces a median age for voters of 55 in 2055. 
Reversing this sharp upward trend in the age of the median voter would 
require a considerable rise in the birth rate very soon. Ignoring migration, 
the age profile of the electorate until 2034 is more or less settled today.  
 
It is worth noting that, once the median voter is close to state pension age 
there is a strong incentive for voters to expand the state pension system to 
its maximum possible size, which would occur when tax rates are at the 
top of the Laffer curve. This is potentially in prospect in a number of EU 
countries where, on average, the electorate is older and government 
spending already high (see Booth, 2008a, Booth 2008b and Smith, 2006).  
 
Actuarial and financial analysis of Policy Change 
One12: increasing the state pension 
 
After projecting the age structure of the electorate, we examined the rate 
of return to voters from an increase in pensions. The increase in pensions 
was assumed to be financed by an increase in National Insurance 
contributions13 paid by the working population. workers would have to pay 
this increase until their retirement age. The increased rate of National 
Insurance contributions can be regarded as the “price” that voters pay for 
the “benefit” of an increase in pension. The increase in National Insurance 
                                            
12 Many of the results relating to “Policy Change One” have previously been presented 
and discussed in Booth (2008b). However, they provide useful context for the analysis of 
“Policy Change Two” so they are repeated here. 
13 The payroll tax used to finance various aspects of government social insurances – 
including pensions – in the UK. 
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contributions required to finance the increase in state pension whilst 
keeping income and expenditure in the National Insurance “fund” in 
balance was calculated using the working and retired population 
projections from the population model. The necessary increase will 
change over time as the age structure of the population changes. The rate 
of interest which makes the present value of the expected increase in 
pension equal to the present value of the expected increase in National 
Insurance contributions, after allowing for mortality, was then calculated 
for a voter of median age and for a new entrant to the workforce (assumed 
to be aged 18). All variables are calculated in real terms.  
 
There are simplifying assumptions in this approach in order to isolate the 
age-dependent effects of the proposed policy change. It is assumed that a 
flat increase in pension is financed by a flat increase in National Insurance 
contributions. This is not in accordance with the administrative 
mechanisms of the National Insurance system by which contributions are 
levied as a percentage of earnings but a flat-rate pension is paid. 
However, we want all distributional issues to be set to one side or, 
equivalently, we want to ensure that the cross-sectional distribution of 
income remains unchanged as a result of the increase in the level of the 
pension. This could be achieved by flat-rate National Insurance 
contribution increases paying for flat-rate pension increases as we have 
assumed here. Alternatively, it could be achieved by increasing pensions 
by a flat-rate amount whilst raising the percentage rate of National 
Insurance contributions levied on earnings and whilst taking other action to 
ensure that the cross-sectional distribution of net income is unchanged. 
Such action could include, for example, simultaneously reducing the basic 
rate of income tax and not raising the basic tax allowance in line with 
earnings: a policy that has, in fact, been followed for most of the last forty 
years.14 Thus, although the precise approach to financing a pension 
increase has been chosen for computational simplicity, the approach is 
financially equivalent to an alternative that is certainly realistic in political 
terms.  
 
It should be noted that, if there are distributional effects of a rise in the 
state pension that (for example) benefit the less well off, then the proposal 
will become better value to some younger voters on low earnings. In turn, 
it will be worse value to some older voters on higher earnings. We are 
simply setting such considerations to one side. Our assumption is not 
unrealistic in the sense that we are denying the existence of the 
distributional implications of the state pension system. Rather, we are 
setting aside distributional issues and focusing on one specific policy 
change – the raising of the state pension whilst the distribution of income 
is otherwise unchanged. The alternative approach of segmenting the 
population by income would increase the realism of the analysis but 
reduce the extent to which the effect of the particular variable of ageing 
was understood. Clearly, this is an area for further research. 
                                            
14 It should also be noted that there have been various changes to tax and benefits 
systems in the UK recently where the government has introduced consequential changes 
to ensure that the distributional effects of the policy were neutralised. The most recent 
case was when the 10% tax band was withdrawn in the 2008 Finance Act.  
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Rate of Return Calculations – voters of median age 
 
It was assumed that the increase in pension was £2,000 per annum in 
2008 prices. The level of the pension increase is irrelevant to determining 
the real rate of return to the median voter because the increase in National 
Insurance contributions is proportional to the assumed increase in the 
pension. The real rate of return to the median voter (j), from successfully 

































x,date = the age of the median voter in year date 
lx+t,date+t/lx,date is the probability of a voter still being alive t years after they 
reach the age of the median voter in year date. Mortality was as assumed 
in the population model. 
NIdate+t = the rate of National Insurance contributions necessary to finance 
the proposed pension increase.  
 
The rate of return from a given increase in pension, financed by the 
necessary increase in National Insurance contributions, is the solution to 
the above equation, j. If date is equal to 2009, for example, the second 
term in the equation would use the age of the median voter in 2009 (x = 
47) and discount all the expected increased National Insurance 
contributions necessary to finance a £2,000 increase in the state pension 
from age 47 to age 64 (date+t = 2009, 2010, 2011 etc, x+t = 47, 48, 49 
etc). The first term in the equation would sum the present value of all the 
expected extra pension payments of £2,000 from the date at which the 
individual would reach 65.  
 
The extent of the increase in National Insurance contributions necessary 
to finance the increase in pensions depends on the age structure of the 
population which largely determines the balance of contributors and 
recipients of benefits. The trend of the increase is shown in Table One 
below. 
Economic rationale 
The rationale for this analysis is straightforward. Voters in the political 
market can choose to maximise their financial best interests when they 
vote. The median voter can obtain a rate of return from deferring income in 
two ways. He can save in the financial markets and obtain a guaranteed 
rate of return above inflation from government index-linked bonds (or 
higher expected returns if investment risk is taken). Alternatively, the voter 
can act in the political market and obtain a rate of return on increased 
National Insurance contributions in the form of a higher state pension. 
Neither of these options is risk free, though the risks attached to each are 
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different.15 The above equation allows us to compute the rate of return to a 
voter from a decision to increase National Insurance contributions. If this is 
more profitable to the median voter than saving through financial markets, 
one can expect the median voter to have a preference for raising his 
pension by voting for higher pensions in the political marketplace.  
 
The rate of return to the median voter from increased state pensions 
increases as the median voter gets older because a given pension 
increase will be financed by fewer years of increased National Insurance 
contributions for that voter. The rate of return will also be related positively 
to life expectancy and be negatively related to the increase in National 
Insurance contributions necessary to finance a given increase in the state 
pension. The increase in National Insurance contributions necessary to 
finance a given increase in the state pension whilst keeping the National 
Insurance fund in balance on a PAYGO basis will, of course, increase as 
the age of the median voter increases (because there will be fewer 
contributors per retiree). This causes a slight offset to the tendency of the 




The variation in the real rate of return to the median voter who 
successfully votes to increase pensions is shown in Figure Three16. At the 
current time, the rate of return is 5.8%. The rate of return will rise quickly to 
7.6% by 2025 and then rise more slowly to 8.8% by 2050. This suggests 
very strong, and increasing, incentives for the median voter to vote to 
increase the size of state pensions. One would expect politicians to 
respond to those incentives, at least at the margin, by offering financial 
packages that benefit the median voter and raise the level of government 
help to pensioners. These packages might not necessarily involve raising 
state pensions directly - other benefits may be provided to the old instead. 
On the other hand, the results suggest that reducing benefits to 
pensioners will be very difficult. 
 
These results can be compared with the risk-free real rate of return that 
the median voter can obtain from saving in financial markets – currently 
about 1% per annum. However, this comparison is not straightforward 
(see Galasso, 2006). The return to the median voter from successfully 
voting for a higher pension is not a risk-free return. Future generations of 
voters could take the increased pension away. Indeed, the voter of median 
age could pay the higher contributions and then find that, because of fiscal 
constraints, future electorates decide that they do not receive a higher 
pension at all – and thus they could receive a return on their additional 
contributions of -100%. Indeed Weaver (1983) suggests that increasing 
the risk that social security pension benefits will not be paid is one way to 
                                            
15 See below.  
16 It should be remembered that in calculating the rates of return we have taken a 
conservative approach by not adjusting the age profile of the electorate for the variation in 
the propensity to vote at different ages. 
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reduce support for the system. However, the influence over the electoral 
system of ageing median voters will reduce the risk that benefits will be 
taken away. If individuals save privately, even through risk-free 
investments such as index-linked government bonds, they are exposed to 
the risk that annuity rates may have become more expensive in the time 
between investment and retirement.  
 
Rate of return calculation – new voters 
 
New voters will have to pay increased contributions all their lives in return 
for an increased pension at retirement. Therefore new voters face both the 
costs and the benefits from a decision to raise the level of pensions.  
 
The changes in the rate of return over time from new voters voting for an 
increase in pension are shown in Figure Four below. It can be seen that 
there is a gradual decline in the rate of return from zero to just below -1%. 
These rates of return are in line with those that can be reasonably 
expected from a Bismarkian PAYGO system during an era of ageing 
population (see Samuelson, 1958, for the original discussion of rates of 
return in PAYGO systems). 
 
It is clear that new voters would gain from a contraction of the state 
pension system and a move towards other methods of pension provision. 
Even if young people were to invest solely in more-or-less risk-free, index-
linked investment instruments they would obtain a higher rate of return 
than the risky rates of return that can be promised through the political 
system. Again, this merely illustrates the result of Browning (1975): social 
security systems can be expanded beyond their optimal level for those 
who pay the full costs of that expansion because the median voter does 
not pay all the costs. The youngest voters, who do pay all the costs of 
expansion because they contribute for a full lifetime as well as receiving a 
pension throughout their retirement, are not sufficiently influential in the 
electoral process to stop the social security system expanding as they 
form only a small proportion of the electorate. 
 
Actuarial and financial analysis of Policy Change 
Two: changing the state pension age 
 
In many countries, it seems to have been possible to reform state 
pensions by raising the state pension age. It might be asked whether this 
casual empirical observation can be reconciled with the predictions of a 
public choice model which, in most respects, suggests that the pension 
system will continue to grow as the population ages. In fact, it can be 
reconciled, as has been shown by Galasso (2006). 
 
We can begin by considering the trivial situation where the median voter is 
older than current state pension age. In this case, any immediate rise in 
the state pension age will have no detrimental impact on the median voter. 
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Similarly, a deferred increase in the state pension age will have no 
detrimental impact on the median voter as long as the deferral period is 
longer than the difference between the age of the median voter and the 
current state pension age. In the UK, for example, the state pension age 
will be increased from 2024. Anybody who will be 65 before 2024 (i.e. who 
was 48 when the measure was passed in 2007) will not lose from this 
policy change. Interestingly, the median voter, after allowing for voting 
propensities, was 49 at the time the increase in pension age was passed 
into law, thus ensuring that over 50% of voters would not lose from the 
change.17 
 
More generally, we have to identify the losers and gainers from a rise in 
the state pension age and this will depend on how the savings are used. In 
general, those countries that have raised the state pension age have done 
so in order to prevent social security taxes from rising to the level that 
would otherwise have prevailed and that is the form of policy change that 
we analyse below. 
 
If the financial savings from a rise in the state pension age are used to 
reduce National Insurance contributions the main losers will be people 
who retire just after the change takes effect. The gainers are new entrants 
into the system whose National Insurance contributions will be reduced 
but who do not suffer from the loss of a year’s pension for many years18. 
Those who retire before the deferral period ends are not directly affected 
by the change as neither their pension nor National Insurance 
contributions will change19.  
 
As has been noted, the greatest impact is felt by those who retire shortly 
after the rise in pension age takes affect. The impact then falls as age 
falls. Younger people will enjoy a larger number of years of the reduced 
level of National Insurance contributions than middle-aged people; they 
will also be further away from the loss of a year’s pension and the 
payment of an extra year’s National Insurance contributions that result 
from the rise in the state pension age. To put it another way, an older 
person who was affected by the increase in the state pension age would 
have to invest a greater sum of money than a younger person to be able 
to privately fund the year of retirement that is lost because of the rise in 
the state pension age. Of course, all members of the population may gain 
from improved labour market efficiency arising from lower labour taxes, but 
this effect can only be captured by general equilibrium models (see 
Galasso, 2006) and this is second order. 
 
                                            
17 When proposals were passed to increase the state pension age for women in 1995, a 
longer deferral period was chosen, consistent with a lower age of median voter. 
18 The extent of gains and losses and how they are distributed here depends on whether 
the population is increasing or declining. There may also be second-round effects from a 
decrease in labour market taxes. 
19 If the savings had been used to finance an increase in the pension, they would gain 
from the change, of course. 
14 
Financial calculations for Policy Change Two 
 
We now examine the public choice implications of a hypothetical recent 
decision by the UK government to increase the state pension age by one 
year in 2008, deferred until 2020.20 This is not unlike the recent policy 
change by the UK government regarding changes to the state pension 
age. It is assumed that the rise in the state pension age is used to finance 
a reduction in National Insurance contributions which is revenue neutral, 
thus maintaining financial balance under the pay-as-you-go principle. The 
decrease in National Insurance contributions that would be financed by the 
rise in the state pension age varies each year and is determined by the 
age structure of the population and the balance between pensioners and 
workers at any particular time. All variables were assumed to be constant 
in real terms. 
 
Again, we abstracted from distributional considerations within cohorts and 
it was assumed that a level decrease in National Insurance contributions 
would be financed by an increase in the state pension age. It could have 
been assumed that the increase in state pension age financed a decrease 
in the percentage rate of National Insurance contributions. If that had been 
the case, then some younger, poorer people would have been worse off 
and some middle-age, richer people better off than our results found. It 
should be stressed, once again, that it is not being suggested that 
distributional considerations are not part and parcel of pensions policy 
changes. It was desired here to isolate the impact of a change in the 
pensions system which had no effect on income distribution within 
generations. 
 
The proposed change in the retirement age would not affect anybody who 
was due to retire before 2020. Individuals aged 54 in 2008 would retire as 
normal in 2019; on the other hand, individuals aged 53 in 2008 would not 
be able to retire at age 65 in 2020 but would have to wait until they were 
aged 66 in 2021. Therefore, nobody aged 54 or over would be affected by 
the policy change. Somebody aged 53 would lose from the change and 
would have no offsetting reduction in National Insurance contributions. 
Anybody below age 53 would pay a reduced level of National Insurance 
contributions (the reduction being made possible by the rise in the state 
pension age) in the years before retirement; then, when they are aged 65, 
such people pay an additional year of National Insurance contributions at 
the lower prevailing level and also lose a year of pension, as compared 
with the situation that would have prevailed before the change in the state 
pension age.  
 
Figure Five shows the reduction in National Insurance contributions in 
constant prices that is made possible by an increase of one year in the 
state pension age, if the balance of revenue and expenditure in the 
National Insurance fund is to remain unchanged. The reduction in National 
Insurance contributions is directly proportional to the level of the state 
                                            
20 This has been chosen because, as will be clear, the decision is a marginal one in 
public choice terms and therefore illustrates the issues well. 
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pension and, for illustration, is shown per £1,000 per annum of state 
pension in constant prices. It can be seen that the change in National 
Insurance contributions fluctuates somewhat on a generally upward trend. 
The reduction is greatest when the number of 65-year-olds is high relative 
to the size of the working population. The number of 65-year-olds is 
affected by the general process of population ageing as well as by 
occasional baby booms and other fluctuations.  
 
Given a state pension of £5,000 per annum (approximately the current 
level in the UK), a new entrant to the workforce would benefit from a 
reduction of about £150 a year in National Insurance contributions 
throughout most of his working life and then, at age 65, lose a year of 
pension worth £5,000 as well as paying additional National Insurance 
contributions in that year. 
 
The equation of value for a person aged x, who is young enough to be 
affected by the change in the state pension age, allowing for mortality, is: 
 
x = the age of a given voter in 2008 
lx+t/lx is the proportion of voters initially aged x in 2008 that is still alive t 
years later. 
 
ΔNI2008+t = is the change in the rate of National Insurance contributions 
that arises in year 2008+t in order to keep the financial balance in the 
National Insurance fund if the retirement age is increased by one year.  
 
The real rate of return, j, paid by a voter of age x, arising from a rise in the 
























This is an equation of value where j (the rate of return to the voter from the 
policy change) is allowed to vary so that the present value of the expected 
change in National Insurance contributions (including the additional year of 
contributions required before the later state pension age) is equal to the 
present value of the lost year of pension at age 65. It has been assumed 
that all cash flows occur at the end of the year. Clearly, the equation only 
applies for those between age 18 and 52. As has been noted, nobody who 
is aged 54 or above is affected by the policy change and those aged 53 
bear only costs with no benefit.  
 
Unlike the situation where we considered an increase in state pensions 
financed by an increase in National Insurance contributions, a lower 
internal rate of return is more favourable for the voter in this case. When 
we consider an increase in state pension age, the policy change involves 
an individual receiving an initial financial benefit that entails a cost at a 
later stage (a lost year of pension). The higher the cost, the worse is the 
outcome for the individual. This situation can be thought of as involving an 
individual borrowing from the government (through reduced National 
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Insurance contributions) and then repaying the government at a later 
stage (through reduced pension payments to the individual). An alternative 
way of thinking about this is as follows: the voter can neutralise the effect 
of the proposed policy change by investing any reduction in National 
Insurance contributions and using the proceeds of the investment to 
purchase the state pension that has been taken away at age 65. A higher 
internal rate of return is an indication that the individual would need a 
higher return in investment markets to compensate for the lost year of 
pension. 
 
There is, of course, a risk attached to the proposed policy change. A 
young voter might vote for the policy change and find that, at the time of 
retirement, the retirement age has been increased further – though it is 
also possible that the retirement age could be reduced back to its previous 
level. In theory, a break-even rate of return should be determined that 
reflects the risk of the policy change to a marginal young elector who may 
just be favourably inclined towards it. In practice it is not possible to 
observe what that rate of return would be from market data and it will vary 
from individual to individual. We will assume that the real rate of return that 
electors would be happy to pay is 2.5% per annum effective 
(approximately 1.5% above the real rate of return from risk-free 
government instruments), but also look at results at a rate of return of 2% 
per annum effective. In effect, therefore, we are assuming that electors 
believe that they will be able to replace the lost year of pension, with an 
equivalent degree of risk, by investing their reduced National Insurance 
contributions in investment instruments bearing a real rate of return of 
2.5% per annum or 2% per annum. 
 
The rate of return to voters of different ages is shown in Figure Six below. 
The rates of return paid by the older voters who are affected by the 
change are very high: for example a 52 year old would experience a 
reduction in National Insurance contributions in 2020 of just £122.33 
(assuming a state pension of £5,000 per annum) and suffer a cost of 
£6,633.95 in 2021 as a result of paying an extra year of National 
Insurance contributions and losing a year of pension. For this reason, to 
prevent the scale of the graph from being too small, the rates of return 
arising from the policy change are shown only up to age 45, the rates of 
return for ages from 46 to 52 range from 41.7% to 640%. 
 
The steep rise in the rate of return with age from this kind of policy is very 
clear from Figure Six. A government wishing to phase in an increase in the 
state pension age can expect a large measure of indifference from the old 
(in this case, defined as those age 54 and above) and from the young; but 
some age groups will be very severely affected. It is also of interest to note 
that the government cannot change this general pattern by the way it 
phases in a change: a rise in the retirement age will always adversely 
affect those just below the cut-off age. The government can lengthen the 
phasing in period so that fewer people in total will be affected, but there 
will always be some people who are adversely affected.  
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Voters aged 18-23 inclusive have a rate of return of 2.5% and, according 
to our assumptions, may be willing to support the policy change. Those at 
the margins or who are not directly affected might be expected to benefit 
slightly from the policy change because of the second-order effects of 
increased labour-market efficiency arising from lower labour-market taxes. 
 
The proportion of voters who benefit from the change is shown in Table 
Two. The proportion is calculated assuming required rates of return of 2% 
and 2.5%, with and without making an allowance for age-related 
differential turnout of voters. 
 
It can be seen that the decision to raise the retirement age by one year 
deferred for 12 years in 2008 would have been an extremely marginal one 
from a public choice point of view in the median voter model. Assuming 
that a government is attempting to build a coalition of active voters 
favourable to reform then, if the required rate return from the expected 
financial cash flows from the policy change were 2.5% (an assumption that 
does not seem unreasonable), then there would just be a majority 
benefiting from reform. 
 
An analysis of actual policy changes 
 
Policy Change Two is on the margins of electoral palatability. The most 
significant related recent policy change in the UK has been the recent 
decision to raise gradually the state retirement age by three years from 65 
to 68. The first part of the increase will take place over two years from 
2024. Here, we just note briefly the differences between the public choice 
impact of that change and the specific change analysed in detail here. 
 
The major difference is that the increase in the state pension age is being 
deferred four years more than has been assumed in the above 
calculations. The direct effect of this is to add four years of age to the 
group that is unaffected by the first round effects of the change – nobody 
aged 50 or older will be affected. This is roughly an additional 7% of the 
electorate.21 There will be some other, second order, effects which are 
likely to be small. For example, younger voters will have to wait longer 
before they benefit from a reduction in National Insurance contributions 
than we assumed in Policy Change Two because of the phasing-in. 
However, some voters will also have to wait longer before the loss of a 
year’s pension – thus reducing the present value of that loss. 
 
Perhaps most crucially, it should be noted that the age of the median voter 
in 2008 was 51, after allowing for voting propensities. This means that the 
increase in the state pension age has been determined so that just over 
50% of the electorate will not be affected at all by the change (and could 
benefit slightly from the general economic benefits arising from lower 
                                            
21 This varies, of course, according to whether an allowance is made for age-related 
propensities to vote, but it does not vary substantially. This percentage will be increased 
slightly further by the phasing of the increase in retirement age over two years. 
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labour market taxes) and thus it should gain electoral support, even 
ignoring the possibility that some young voters will benefit. So it is clear 
that the one significant cost-reducing pension reform in the UK in the last 
20 years has been determined in such a way that the majority of voters 
either benefit from the change or will not lose from it.  
 
As has been noted, the specific way in which changes to state pension 
benefits are being brought in will also have some impact on income 
distribution. We have abstracted from these effects for reasons already 
discussed. In this particular case, if there is a reduction in the percentage 
rate of National Insurance contributions financed by an increase in 
pension age, then there will be some younger, poorer people who will gain 
less than the average young person from the rise in the retirement age. At 
the same time, there will be some older, better-off people who will lose 
less than the average older person. In any case, with regard to the UK 
state pension age, over 50% of active voters were exempt from any 
impact of the change as a result of its deferral. Any younger people who 
benefited from the increase in state pension age would simply add more 





The calculations in this paper reveal that there will be strong democratic 
pressures in the UK to expand government pension systems as the 
population ages. The pressures in most other European countries are 
likely to be greater because of the greater maturity of the age structure of 
the population. However, it has also been shown that it is possible to scale 
back pension systems by raising retirement ages because the public 
choice impact of such a policy is often more favourable than the impact of, 
for example, reducing the size of pensions in real terms.  
 
The calculations are remarkably consistent with practice in most European 
countries. Thus the formal theory and related calculations seem to explain 
public policy in practice. This is a result that has been found by other 
authors in different contexts. Retirement ages in state pension schemes 
have often been increased – with deferral periods being chosen so that 
the results are acceptable in public choice terms. At the same time, it has 
been difficult to scale back benefits. It is also interesting that this result is 
consistent with the strategy for short-run reform proposed by Buchanan 
(1983). 
 
Further research would be useful to investigate the way in which changes 
to state pension schemes affect the distribution of income within 
generations. This would require detailed information of income distribution 
on a cross-sectional basis. Research can also be undertaken using 
general equilibrium models that can capture second-order effects. 
However, the results of the above work, where possible, have been 
checked against the results from a general equilibrium model which has 
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been used for very detailed calculations in a number of countries (see 
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Table One – Increase in National Insurance contributions necessary to finance a £2,000 





 Proportion of active 
voters who benefit % 
Proportion of those 
registered to vote 
who benefit % 
Required return 2% 49% 44.6 
Required return 2.5% 51% 47.9 
Table Two - Proportion of voters benefiting from Policy Change Two 
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